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ABSTRACT
An important unresolved question is whether non-state plaintiffs have 
standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to sue in federal courts 
in climate change cases. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held 
a state government could sue the U.S. government to address climate change 
issues, and suggested, but did not decide, that private litigants might have
lesser rights than states. In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 
the Ninth Circuit held that private groups did not have standing to
challenge Washington State’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from five oil refineries, and implied that private plaintiffs may
never bring climate change suits because such suits are generalized 
grievances and the Massachusetts exception for GHG suits applies only 
to states. However, dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of a rehearing
en banc, three judges argued that the panel’s opinion was overly broad in 
interpreting the Massachusetts decision to deny standing rights to all non-
state GHG plaintiffs. In recent district court decisions, two different federal
judges concluded that private plaintiffs may have Article III standing to 
challenge the government’s regulation of climate change or greenhouse
gases. In Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, the Western District of
Washington held the plaintiff suffered concrete standing injuries from the 
defendant EPA’s approval of Washington’s and Oregon’s decisions not to
288
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identify any waters experiencing ocean acidification as impaired under the 
Clean Water Act (CWA). In distinguishing the Washington Environmental 
Council decision, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs demonstrated
local GHG impacts, and local mitigation efforts could partially redress the 
injuries to their members. In Murray Energy Corporation v. Gina McCarthy, 
Administrator of EPA, the Northern District of West Virginia concluded 
that that the plaintiffs sufficiently established that the EPA violated its duty
under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to examine the employment impacts of its 
enforcement and regulations under the Act on employment in the coal mining
industry to have standing. The Murray decision’s focus on employment
injuries could be used to provide standing in a challenge to GHG regulations.
While there is an argument that expanding standing to non-state GHG
plaintiffs could flood the federal courts with too many suits, courts can
manage the number of climate change suits by requiring a meaningful
demonstration of a connection between GHG emissions and harms to the 
plaintiffs, and by giving substantial deference to reasonable government 
regulatory policies in this area.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important unresolved question is whether non-state plaintiffs, 
including private parties and political subdivisions of a state, have standing 
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to file suit in the federal courts 
in cases involving climate change and greenhouse gases (GHGs).1  In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that a state government, 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, had Article III standing to sue the
defendant U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its failure to 
regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles because states are “entitled 
to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”2 Massachusetts did not directly
address whether non-state parties have similar standing rights to bring climate
change suits against the federal government or large private GHG emitters, 
but implied that private parties might have lesser standing rights when it
1. The Supreme Court has distinguished between state plaintiffs and non-state 
plaintiffs, including private parties and political subdivisions of a state, regarding whether they
“may invoke the federal common law of nuisance to abate out-of-state pollution.”  Am. Elec. 
Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 422 (2011). 
2. 549 U.S. 497, 518–21 (2007); see Charles H. Haake & Raymond B. Ludwiszewski,
Standing Up for Industry Standing in Environmental Regulatory Challenges, 42 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 305, 318–19 (2015) (discussing the Massachusetts decision and its 
implications); Mank, WEC, supra note * (same), at 1528; see infra Section III.A.
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declared that “[i]t is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review
here is a sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan [v. Defenders of Wildlife],
a private individual.”3 
In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon (WEC), the Ninth 
Circuit held that two private non-profit groups did not have standing under 
Article III to sue in federal court to challenge Washington State’s failure to
regulate GHG emissions from five oil refineries in that state because the
plaintiffs failed to allege that the emissions were significant enough to make a
“meaningful contribution” to global GHG levels.4  The Ninth Circuit
suggested that private plaintiffs may never bring climate change suits because
such suits are generalized grievances and clearly stated that the
Massachusetts liberalized approach for standing in GHG suits applies only
to states and not to non-state parties.5  Dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s
denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a rehearing en banc, three judges argued that 
the three-judge panel’s opinion was overly broad in interpreting the 
Massachusetts decision to deny standing rights to all non-state GHG plaintiffs.6 
This Author has questioned the Ninth Circuit’s implication that non-state
plaintiffs may never have standing to bring climate change suits because
Massachusetts did not clearly decide the question of standing in private 
climate change suits and the plaintiffs in WEC were only challenging the
greenhouse gas emissions of five refineries in one state; a non-state suit 
challenging the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s national regulation
of GHG emissions might meet Article III standing requirements.7 
In recent district court decisions, two different federal judges suggested 
that private plaintiffs may have Article III standing to challenge the 
government’s regulation of climate change or greenhouse gases. In Center 
for Biological Diversity v. EPA (CBD), the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington held members of the plaintiff Center for
Biological Diversity (CBD) suffered concrete standing injuries caused by
the defendant EPA’s approval of Washington’s and Oregon’s decisions not 
to identify any waters experiencing ocean acidification as impaired under 
3. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555 (1992)); see Haake & Ludwiszewski, supra note 2, at 319–20; Mank, WEC, supra
note *, at 1528; see infra Section III.A. 
4. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon (WEC), 732 F.3d 1131, 1146 (9th Cir. 2013),
reh’g en banc denied, Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014); see 
infra Section IV.B. 
5. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1144–46; Haake & Ludwiszewski, supra note 2, at 320; 
Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1572, 1583; see infra Section IV.B.
 6. Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d 1079–81 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Gould, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1580–83;
see infra Section IV.C.
 7. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1576, 1582–85. 
290
MANK (DO NOT DELETE) 10/18/2018 11:20 AM      




     
    
 
 















   
 
  
    
   
 
[VOL. 53:  287, 2016] Plaintiffs Challenging Greenhouse Gas 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the Clean Water Act (CWA),8 where the members alleged that their
recreational opportunities to catch shellfish in the two states’ coastlines and
estuaries were diminishing.9 In distinguishing the Ninth Circuit’s WEC 
decision, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs met the overlapping 
causation and redressability requirements for standing because the EPA’s
actions adversely affected regional drivers of acidification in the two 
states, and local mitigation efforts could partially redress the injuries to
their members.10  By focusing on local and regional impacts of acidification,
the district court was able to recognize standing for a private GHG suit 
despite the WEC decision’s presumptive foreclosure of non-state suits 
involving only global injuries.11 
In Murray Energy Corporation v. Gina McCarthy, Administrator of
EPA, the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia 
concluded that that the plaintiffs, Murray Energy Corporation and its various
subsidiaries or affiliated companies (Murray), sufficiently established that
the EPA violated its duty under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to examine the 
impacts of its enforcement and regulations on employment in the coal mining
industry for the plaintiffs’ workforce for standing.12  By focusing on the 
employment impacts of the EPA’s CAA regulations, the Murray decision 
concluded that a regulated industry had Article III standing to challenge the 
EPA’s alleged failure to consider the employment impacts of certain past CAA
regulations.13  The Murray decision’s focus on employment injuries could be 
used to provide standing in a challenge to GHG regulations, especially for 
entities regulated under the Clean Air Act or similar statutes that require 
a federal agency to consider the employment or economic impacts of 
environmental regulations.
Arguably, expanding standing to non-state GHG plaintiffs could flood 
the federal courts with too many suits.14  In his dissenting opinion in 
Massachusetts, Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with the majority’s view 
that states were entitled to a more lenient standing test in climate change suits,
8.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
9. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1186–97 (W.D. 
Wash. 2015).
10. Id. at 1189–97. 
11. See id. at 1190, 1192; see infra Section V.
12. No. 5:14–CV–39, 2015 WL 1438036 *6 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2015) (discussing 
EPA’s duty to consider employment impacts of its Clean Air Act regulations under 42 
U.S.C. § 7621). 
13. Id.; see infra Section VI.
 14. See infra Sections II.B and Conclusion. 
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but he also suggested that limiting GHG suits to state plaintiffs would limit
the harm compared to allowing suits by other plaintiffs.15  While there is an
argument that expanding standing to non-state GHG plaintiffs could flood the
federal courts with too many suits, courts can manage the number of climate
change suits by requiring a meaningful demonstration of a connection between
GHG emissions and harms to the plaintiffs, and by giving substantial 
deference to reasonable government regulatory policies.16 
Part II discusses the basic principles of constitutional Article III standing.17 
Part III examines how the Massachusetts decision addressed state standing,
the implications of that decision for non-state GHG suits, and how the 
Supreme Court’s divided decision in American Electric Power Co. v. 
Connecticut (“AEP”),18 failed to clarify the relationship between state and
non-state standing.19  Part IV explores the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Washington Environmental Council and explains why that decision’s
rejection of private GHG suits was overly broad.20  Part V discusses the CBD
decision’s use of local and regional water pollution issues to distinguish
the decision in WEC.21  Part VI examines how the district court’s decision in
Murray could enable regulated parties to use employment impacts to
challenge CAA regulation of GHGs.22  The Conclusion argues that courts 
should be more lenient in deciding the preliminary issue of standing in 
borderline cases to give plaintiffs the opportunity to present their best case
of harm from a defendant’s GHG emissions, but that courts in deciding 
the merits should require plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a defendant’s emissions specifically harmed the plaintiff.23 
II. INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE III STANDING24 
Although the Constitution does not expressly require that each plaintiff 
suing in a federal court prove standing, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
Article III’s limitation of judicial authority to actual “Cases” and 
15. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 547–49 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); see infra Sections II.B and Conclusion. 
16. See infra Conclusion. 
17. See infra Section II.
18.  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
19. See infra Section III. 
20. See infra Section IV.
 21. See infra Section V.
 22. See infra Section VI.
 23. See infra Conclusion. 
24. The discussion of standing in Section II relies upon my earlier standing articles 
cited in footnote 1. 
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“Controversies” as imposing constitutional standing requirements.25 The
Supreme Court has established a three-part test for constitutional Article III
standing that requires a plaintiff to show that:  (1) she has “suffered an
injury-in-fact,” which is (a) “concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) there is “a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be
fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the
court;” and (3) it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.”26  For purposes of this Article,
it is notable that the traceable causation standard for standing requires less
proof than the proximate causation standard typically used in deciding a 
tort case or an environmental case on the merits.27 
25. The constitutional standing requirements are derived from Article III, Section
2, which provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to 
Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of
another State; between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340–41 (2006)
(explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case and controversy requirement
necessitates standing limitations and clarifying that “[i]f a dispute is not a proper case or 
controversy, the courts have no business deciding it . . . .”); see generally Michael E.
Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 
1036–38 (2009) (discussing a scholarly debate on whether the Framers intended the 
Constitution to require standing to sue).
26. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (second, third, 
and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391 
n.6 (2014) (explaining distinction between fairly traceable causation for standing and
proving proximate causation on the merits); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168– 
69 (1997) (same); Mank, Private Parties, supra note *, at 922–27 (same). However, the 
standard for what is “fairly traceable” standing causation is somewhat uncertain even if
courts should treat standing causation as less than merits causation. Note, Causation In
Environmental Law: Lessons From Toxic Torts, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2256, 2264–65, 2271– 
77 (2015) (discussing uncertainties of standing causation and arguing that standing causation 
should be less than merits causation).  But see Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand
the Causation Prong of Standing, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1245–46, 1297–99 (2011)
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A plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all three standing elements.28 
Accordingly, for a federal court to have jurisdiction over a suit, at least
one plaintiff must prove he has standing for each form of relief sought.29 
Federal courts must dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction if no plaintiff 
meets the Article III standing requirements.30 
As indicated above, standing requirements are based on core constitutional 
principles inferred from Article III’s delineation of the judicial authority of
federal courts. For instance, standing principles prohibit advisory opinions as
unconstitutional because such opinions are not based on an actual “case” or
“controversy.”31  Additionally, standing requirements are derived from
fundamental separation of powers principles inferred from the Constitution’s
three-branch form of government, which includes the division of powers 
between the judiciary and political branches of government so that the 
“Federal Judiciary respects ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the 
courts in a democratic society.’”32 Different members of the Supreme Court 
have disagreed, however, concerning the degree to which separation of
powers principles limit Congress’s authority to authorize standing to sue in
federal courts for private citizen suits challenging executive branch decisions.33 
For example, many environmental statutes have citizen suit provisions 
(arguing courts should change standing causation standard to proximate cause, so that standing
law can serve a “gatekeeping function”).
28. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdiction 
must “carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III”); Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 561. 
29. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351–52 (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate 
standing separately for each form of relief sought.”) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)). 
30. See id. at 340–41 (emphasizing the importance of the case or controversy
requirement); Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180 (adding that courts have an affirmative duty at the 
outset of the litigation to ensure that litigants satisfy all Article III standing requirements).
31. See Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (“Article III of the Constitution
restricts the power of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’. . . ‘Federal courts may
not decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them’ or 
give ‘opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’”)
(citations omitted).
32. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
(1984), partially abrogated on different grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)).
 33. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–78 (1992) (concluding
that Articles II and III of the Constitution limit Congress’s authority to authorize citizen suits 
by any person lacking a concrete injury and citing several recent Supreme Court decisions for
support), with id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to define 
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before.”), and id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “principal
effect” of the majority’s approach to standing was “to transfer power into the hands of the
Executive at the expense—not of the Courts—but of Congress, from which that power 
originates and emanates”).
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allowing any “person” or “citizen” to sue polluters who commit certain legal
violations or the Administrator of EPA if she fails to perform a mandatory
duty; these provisions typically do not differentiate states from others.34 




In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA for failing to regulate GHGs 
from new motor vehicles that allegedly cause climate change.36  Importantly, 
the Court recognized for the first time that states have greater standing rights
in some circumstances than non-state litigants.37  However, the Court’s 
reasoning that the Commonwealth met the three-part standing test for injury,
causation and redressability arguably could be used by a private plaintiff 
who alleges similar injuries from rising sea levels to demonstrate that his 
allegations about harm from climate change also meet Article III standing 
principles.38 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion in Massachusetts argued that 
states do not have greater standing rights than other litigants;39 this
argument possibly helps non-state litigants to some extent by de-
emphasizing the differences between the standing rights of non-state and 
state parties.40 On the other hand, his argument that the generalized injuries
resulting from climate change are better addressed through the political 
process than the judiciary would probably bar all climate change suits.41 
Chief Justice Roberts also indirectly touched on whether limiting GHG 
34. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) (stating “any citizen” may challenge certain 
Clean Water Act violations); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012) (stating “any person” may challenge 
certain Clean Air Act violations). 
35. The discussion of Massachusetts v. EPA and state standing in Part II is based
on my earlier articles, supra note *, and especially Mank, Private Parties, supra note *, at 
880–88 and Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1536–45. 
36. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521, 526 (2007); Mank, WEC, supra note 
*, at 1536. 
37. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–20; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1536–38. 
38. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1541. 
39. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536–40 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1542–45. 
40. See Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1542–44. 
41. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535, 546–47 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Mank, 
WEC, supra note *, at 1536, 1542–45. 
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suits to state plaintiffs would prevent GHG suits from overwhelming the 
federal courts.42 
A. Justice Stevens’s Majority Opinion on State Standing 
1. The Special Standing Rights of States
The Massachusetts decision invoked the parens patriae doctrine as a 
justification for giving greater standing rights to states, and its reliance on 
that doctrine to establish standing implicitly weakens the standing arguments
of non-state litigants.43  The parens patriae doctrine has origins in English 
common law doctrine regarding the authority of the English King to act as a
guardian for incompetent persons such as minors, the mentally ill, and 
mentally limited persons.44  Beginning in the early twentieth century, federal 
courts have allowed states to sue as parens patriae to protect their quasi-
sovereign interests in the health, welfare, and natural resources of their 
citizens.45 
Citing the parens patriae doctrine, Justice Stevens in his Massachusetts 
decision stated that “the special position and interest of Massachusetts”
was significant in determining its standing rights.46  He stated that “[i]t is 
of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign 
State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual.”47  Justice Stevens relied
upon the Court’s 1907 decision in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, which
recognized Georgia’s right to sue in federal court on behalf of its citizens to
protect them from air pollution from another state because of Georgia’s
quasi-sovereign interest in the state’s natural resources and the health of 
its citizens.48 Additionally, he noted that the Court had for many years 
“recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of 
invoking federal jurisdiction.”49  Accordingly, Justice Stevens determined in
the Massachusetts decision that, “[j]ust as Georgia’s independent interest
‘in all the earth and air within its domain’ supported federal jurisdiction
 42. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 548. 
43. Id. at 518–20 (majority opinion); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1536–38. 
44. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600
(1982); Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY
L.J. 195, 195 (1978) (discussing development of parens patriae doctrine in English 
common law to allow English King to act as the guardian for children and mentally
incompetent persons); Mank, States Standing, supra note *, at 1756–57. 
45. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19; Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 
230, 237 (1907); Mank, States Standing, supra note *, at 1757–59. 
46. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1537. 
47. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518. 
48. Id. at 518–19 (citing Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237); Mank, WEC, supra
note *, at 1537. 
49. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1537. 
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a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its
sovereign territory today.”50 Furthermore, he observed that Massachusetts
ownership of a significant extent of the coastline allegedly affected by 
climate change bolstered the case for recognizing standing in Article III 
courts.51 
Further explaining the relevance of the parens patriae doctrine to the 
question of state standing, Justice Stevens explained that states had
standing to protect their quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare 
of their citizens because they had surrendered three important sovereign 
powers to the federal government: (1) states may no longer use military
force to resolve differences with other states; (2) the Constitution prohibits 
states from negotiating treaties with foreign governments; and (3) federal 
laws may sometimes preempt state laws.52  Because states had transferred 
these three sovereign powers to the federal government, the Court invoked 
the parens patriae doctrine to preserve a special place for the states in a
federal system of government by recognizing that states can file suit in
federal court to protect quasi-sovereign interests in the health, welfare,
and natural resources of their citizens.53 
Justice Stevens joined the parens patriae argument for standing rights 
for states with a procedural rights argument based on statutory language 
in the Clean Air Act (CAA) that Massachusetts had the right to sue because 
the Act required the EPA to use the federal government’s sovereign powers 
to protect states, among others, from vehicle emissions “which in [the
Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”54 Relatedly, 
the Massachusetts decision observed that Congress in the Act had “recognized 
a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking 
petition as arbitrary and capricious.”55  Combining these procedural and 
50. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19 (quoting Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237);
Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1537. 
51. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (quoting Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237); 
Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1537. 
52.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1537–38. 
53. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1538. 
54. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006));
see also Haake & Ludwiszewski, supra note 2, at 319 (observing that state standing in 
Massachusetts rested upon both procedural statutory right and quasi-sovereign rights); Mank,
WEC, supra note *, at 1538. 
55. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012)); see also
Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1538. 
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parens patriae justifications for standing, Justice Stevens concluded, “[g]iven
that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-
sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our
standing analysis.”56  However, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion
correctly observed that in the CAA provisions cited by the majority “Congress 
treated public and private litigants exactly the same” so that there was no 
basis for giving greater statutory or procedural rights to states than private 
plaintiffs.57 
The Massachusetts decision failed to clarify to what extent the Court’s 
recognition of special state standing rights resulted from the parens
patriae doctrine as opposed to statutory or procedural rights in the CAA.58 
Because the Massachusetts decision rested upon multiple factors and not
just the special parens patriae standing rights of states, it is difficult to 
evaluate how the Massachusetts decision might affect the standing of non-
state parties in climate change suits.59  As is discussed in Part IV, judges on
the Ninth Circuit in WEC disagreed about the impact of the Massachusetts
decision on private party standing in a GHG suit.60 
2. Massachusetts and Standing Tests for Injury, Causation,
and Redressability 
Although declaring that states are entitled to a more lenient standing 
test under the parens patriae doctrine and possibly the CAA as well, the 
Court also indicated that the Commonwealth had established Article III 
standing test for injury, causation, and redressability.61  The Court’s discussion 
of how Massachusetts met these three standing tests might also allow
some private plaintiffs to prove standing.62  Concerning the injury part of
the standing test, the Court concluded that climate change had caused
rising sea levels that had already harmed Massachusetts’ coastline and 
posed potentially more dangerous harms in the future.63  Rejecting the
56. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520; see also Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1538. 
57. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
58. Mank, States Standing, supra note *, at 1733–34, 1746–47, 1755–56 (criticizing 
Massachusetts for not clarifying whether and to what extent the special treatment of state
standing in the case resulted from the parens patriae doctrine as opposed to the special 
standing rights of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate procedural rights or other factors); Mank, 
WEC, supra note *, at 1538–39, 1541–42. 
59. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1538–39, 1541–42.
 60. See infra Sections IV.B and IV.C (discussing panel decision, dissenting opinion 
and concurring opinion). 
61. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526. 
62. See Section III.A.2. 
63. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521–23; Mank, Future Generations, supra note *, 
at 71–73. 
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view in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion that no plaintiff has
standing to challenge global harms creating a generalized grievance for 
humanity,64 Justice Stevens stated, “that these climate-change risks are ‘widely
shared’ does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this
litigation.”65  Distinguishing the Commonwealth from other litigants because 
Massachusetts “owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,” 
the Court determined that “[the Commonwealth] has alleged a particularized
injury in its capacity as a landowner” even if many others have suffered
similar injuries.66 
Addressing the causation part of the standing test, the Court observed 
that “EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection between
manmade [GHG] emissions and global warming.”67  Because EPA conceded 
that man-made GHG emissions cause climate change, Justice Stevens 
concluded that “[a]t a minimum, therefore, EPA’s refusal to regulate such 
emissions ‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’ injuries.”68  The Court rejected 
EPA’s causation argument that a suit was inappropriate because other
countries such as China could not regulate under the CAA because it “rests
on the erroneous assumption that a small incremental step, because it is
incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum.”69 Justice 
Stevens noted that agencies and legislatures “do not generally resolve 
massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.”70  He reasoned, “[t]hat a first 
step might be tentative does not by itself support the notion that federal
courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step conforms to law.”71 
Moreover, the Court determined that “reducing domestic automobile 
emissions is hardly a tentative step” because “the United States transportation
sector emits an enormous quantity of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere . . .
more than 1.7 billion metric tons in 1999 alone.”72  Because domestic
automobile emissions account for more than 6% of worldwide carbon
dioxide emissions, the Court held that “U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make
 64. See supra Section III.B.
 65. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522 (“Where a harm is concrete, though widely
shared, the Court has found ‘injury-in-fact.’” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524
U.S. 11, 24 (1998))). 
66. Id.
 67. Id. at 523. 
68. Id.
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a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, 
according to petitioners, to global warming.”73  As this Article will discuss in
Part IV, the Ninth Circuit in WEC emphasized the “meaningful contribution” 
language in Massachusetts as an essential test for determining which GHG
suits can establish sufficient standing causation to sue in federal courts.74 
Lastly, the Court rejected the EPA’s argument that the plaintiffs could 
not satisfy the redressability portion of the standing test because federal
courts could not remedy GHG emissions from other countries.75  The Court
concluded that the EPA had a duty under the CAA to reduce future harms 
to Massachusetts even if it could not prevent the majority of harms from 
GHG emissions: “While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle
emissions will not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows 
that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps
to slow or reduce it.”76  Responding to EPA’s argument that its regulation of
GHG emissions from new vehicles would have little impact because of
increasing emissions from developing countries such as China and India,
the Court stated: “A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of 
global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.”77 Furthermore, 
the Court suggested that EPA had a duty to prevent catastrophic harms 
to future generations: “The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is
nevertheless real.  That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners
received the relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners have
standing to challenge EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition.”78  As
this Article will discuss in Part III, the Ninth Circuit in WEC interpreted the 
Massachusetts decision’s approach to the redressability standing test to
require that a plaintiff’s proposed remedy significantly “slow or reduce” 
climate change and not to encompass any remedy that might only marginally 
reduce GHGs to a small degree.79 
Despite its declaration that states are entitled to “special solicitude” in 
deciding their standing in federal courts, the Massachusetts decision’s 
discussion of the injury, causation and redressability standing elements 
did not offer clear grounds for distinguishing between the standing rights
of state and non-state plaintiffs.80  For instance, a private or municipal land 
owner could endure similar injuries from rising sea levels on its coastal
 73. Id. at 524–25 (emphasis added). 
74. See WEC, 732 F.3d 1131, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2013); see infra Section IV.B.
 75. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517, 525–26. 
76. Id. at 525. 
77. Id. at 525–26. 
78. Id. at 526. 
79. See WEC, 732 F.3d 1131, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2013); see infra Section IV.B.
 80. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1541. 
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property as the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.81  Although the Court did
observe that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts “owns a substantial 
portion of the state’s coastal property,”82 there is no sound reason in standing
doctrine to treat an injury to a large amount of land differently from a similar
injury to a smaller amount of land as long as both injuries are imminent
and concrete.83  The traceable causation and redressability issues in climate
change cases related to the fact that most emissions arise from outside the
U.S. are arguably similar whether the plaintiffs are states or non-state
parties.84  Accordingly, the Massachusetts decision’s discussion of the injury,
causation and redressability standing elements did not demonstrate good 
reasons for distinguishing between the standing rights of state and other 
types of plaintiffs. 
B. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the global 
issue of climate change was a nonjusticiable general grievance that should be
decided by the political branches and not by federal courts.85  Also, he
concluded that the Court should not apply a more lenient standing test for states
because neither the CAA nor the parens patriae doctrine justified treating
state plaintiffs differently from non-state litigants.86  While implying that states 
and private parties have roughly equal standing rights,87 Justice Roberts’
dissenting opinion essentially rejected the idea of GHG litigation by either
private parties or states because climate change is a generalized political 
grievance better addressed by the political branches rather than Article III
courts.88 
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the tests for “what is ‘fairly’ 
traceable or ‘likely’ to be redressed” were “subject to some debate.”89
 81. Id.
 82. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522. 
83. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1541. 
84. Id.
 85. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535, 548–49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)); see also Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1542, 
1544. 
86. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536–40; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1542–43. 
87. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536–40.; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1542–44. 
88. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535, 548–49; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 
1545. 
89. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 547. 
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However, he contended that a too loose approach to standing causation and
redressability would lead to federal courts intruding on the role of the
political branches.90  He compared the majority decision with the Court’s 
heavily criticized 1973 decision in United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),91 which found standing causation
between a proposed increase in railroad rates, a potential increased use of
non-recycled goods because of the proposed rate increase, and, finally, a
possible increase in litter in parks because of a potential increased use of
natural resources resulting from the proposed rate increase.92  Chief Justice 
Roberts reasoned: 
Over time, SCRAP became emblematic not of the looseness of Article III standing
requirements, but of how utterly manipulable they are if not taken seriously as a 
matter of judicial self-restraint. SCRAP made standing seem a lawyer’s game, 
rather than a fundamental limitation ensuring that courts function as courts and
not intrude on the politically accountable branches. Today’s decision is SCRAP 
for a new generation.93 
He then suggested that the majority had constrained standing to state 
plaintiffs to limit the potential flood of litigation that might result from the 
Court’s relaxed approach to standing causation and redressability.94 Chief 
Justice Roberts explained: “How else to explain its need to devise a new
doctrine of state standing to support its result?  The good news is that the
Court’s ‘special solicitude’ for Massachusetts limits the future applicability of
the diluted standing requirements applied in this case.”95  Nevertheless, he 
disagreed with the majority because its standing doctrine allowing some
climate change suits “transgress[ed]” the proper role of federal courts by
allowing them to decide cases more appropriately resolved by the political
branches.96  While he argued that neither states nor private parties should have
standing because climate change is a political issue unsuited for judicial
resolution,97 Chief Justice Roberts implied that limiting standing in GHG
suits to state plaintiffs would limit the harm of such suits compared to allowing
all plaintiffs to sue.98  However, this Article’s conclusion will show that federal
courts can put meaningful limits on GHG suits by non-state parties.99
 90. Id. at 547–49. 
91.  412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
92. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 547–48 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
93. Id. at 548. 
94. Id. at 546–48. 
95. Id. at 548. 
96. Id. at 548–49. 
97. Id. at 535–49. 
98. Id. at 548. 
99. See infra Conclusion. 
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C. Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.100 
Since its Massachusetts decision, the Supreme Court has had only one 
opportunity to consider the question of the standing of non-state parties in
climate change suits, but it avoided directly answering the question in that 
case. In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP),101 the Court, 
by an equally divided vote of four to four, affirmed a Second Circuit 
decision holding that both state and private plaintiffs had standing in a tort 
suit seeking GHG reductions from the five largest utility emitters of carbon
dioxide in the United States.102  The Court stated, “Four members of the
Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing 
under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal
to regulate [GHG] emissions . . . and, further, that no other threshold
obstacle bars review.”103 The Court did not explain the identity of the “some
plaintiffs,” but commentators have speculated that the four justices affirming
the Second Circuit’s decision on standing could only agree that the state 
plaintiffs had standing.104 AEP is a puzzling decision because both state
and non-state plaintiffs were involved in the case, but the Supreme Court
never explicated whether non-state plaintiffs may have standing in a 
climate change suit.105 
1. The Lower Courts’ Decisions in AEP
In 2004, two groups of plaintiffs filed separate suits in the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that five defendant 
electric power companies were creating a public nuisance by operating
fossil-fuel burning electric power plants in the United States that emitted
large amounts of carbon dioxide that significantly contributed to global 
100. The discussion of Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. is based upon
my prior articles. See Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note *; Mank, Private Parties, supra note *, at
888–98; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1546–57. 
101. AEP, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
102. See id. 416–420; Mank, Private Parties, supra note *, at 873, 894; Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1528, 1553–57; infra Section IV.C. 
103. Id. at 420 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Mank, Private Parties, supra
note *, at 873, 894; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1528–29, 1553. 
104. Mank, Private Parties, supra note *, at 873, 897–98; Mank, Tea Leaves, supra
note *, at 591–92; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1529, 1554–57; infra Section IV.C.2. 
105. Mank, Private Parties, supra note *, at 873, 897–98; Mank, Tea Leaves, supra
note *, at 591–92, 599; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1529, 1556–57; infra Section IV.C.2.
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climate change.106 Eight States107 filed the first complaint (“states plaintiffs”),
and were joined by New York City, a political subdivision of a state.108  Three 
private nonprofit land trusts109 filed the second complaint (land trust
plaintiffs).110  The defendants were four private companies111 and the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federally owned corporation that 
operates fossil-fuel electric power plants in several states.112  According to the
complaints, the defendants “are the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in
the United States.”113  At the time of the complaint, the five utilities annually
emitted 650 million tons of carbon dioxide, which represented 25% of
emissions from the U.S. electric power sector, 10% of emissions from all
U.S. human activities, and 2.5% of all human emissions worldwide.114 
In their complaints, both groups of plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ 
carbon-dioxide emissions exacerbated global climate change and accordingly 
violated either the federal common law of interstate nuisance, or, in the
alternative, state tort law.115 The states plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’
GHG emissions were harming their public lands, infrastructure, and the
health of their citizens.116  The land trust plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ 
activities worsened climate change and, therefore, would destroy habitats
for animals and rare species of trees and plants on land these plaintiffs 
owned or conserved.117  Both groups of plaintiffs sought essentially identical
injunctive relief requiring each defendant “to cap its carbon dioxide 
emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at
least a decade.”118 
In 2005, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
dismissed both suits as presenting non-justiciable political questions 
106. AEP, 564 U.S. at 418; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1546. 
107. California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
and Wisconsin were the original state plaintiffs, although New Jersey and Wisconsin withdrew
from the case by the time it came before the Supreme Court. AEP, 564 U.S. at 418 n.3; Mank,
WEC, supra note *, at 1546 n.122.
 108. AEP, 564 U.S. at 418. 
109. Id. at 418 n.4. 
110. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267–68 & nn.2–3
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309, 393 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded, AEP, 564
U.S. at 410, 429 (2011). 
111. American Electric Power Company, Inc. (and a wholly owned subsidiary),
Southern Company, Xcel Energy Inc., and Cinergy Corporation, which is now merged into
Duke Energy Corporation. AEP, 564 U.S. at 418 n.5; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1546. 
112. AEP, 564 U.S. at 418. 
113. Id. 
114. Id.; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1546. 
115. AEP, 564 U.S. at 418; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1547. 
116. AEP, 564 U.S. at 418; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1547. 
117. AEP, 564 U.S. at 418–19.; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1547. 
118. AEP, 564 U.S. at 419; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1547. 
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because the decision whether to grant injunctive relief raised complex
policy issues that are more appropriately resolved by the executive and
legislative branches of government than the courts.119  However, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the decision of the district
court.120  The case was argued before the Second Circuit in 2006, but the
court of appeals did not decide the case until 2009.121  The Second Circuit
probably delayed its decision until the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts
because the Second Circuit’s opinion extensively relied upon the 
Massachusetts decision in its analysis.122  Furthermore, Judge Sonia 
Sotomayor was a member of the original three-judge panel of the Second 
Circuit until she was elevated to the Supreme Court by President Obama’s 
nomination and Senate confirmation in August 2009.123  The two remaining 
members of the original panel decided the case on September 21, 2009 
pursuant to a Second Circuit rule on that issue.124 
Initially considering the threshold jurisdiction questions, the Second 
Circuit held that the suits were not barred by the political question doctrine,125 
and that all of the plaintiffs’ complaints met Article III standing
requirements.126 The court of appeals concluded that the political question
doctrine raised by the district court and the defendants did not bar the 
plaintiffs’ suit because the action was similar in its essential nature to 
other public nuisance cases that courts had handled in the past, even if
climate change was a new issue.127  Assessing the merits of the case, the
Second Circuit held that all the plaintiffs had stated a claim pursuant to
“the federal common law of nuisance.”128 
The district court’s decision explicitly declined to address the defendants’
standing arguments because it concluded that the standing issues were 
“intertwined” with the merits and because it held that the regulation of 
119. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1547–48. 
120. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009). 
121. Id. at 310; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1548. 
122. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 336–38; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1548. 
123. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 314 n.*; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1548. 
124. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 310, 314 n*; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 
1548. 
125. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 332; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1549. 
126. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 349; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1549. 
127. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 332; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1549. 
128. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 371; see also Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 
1549. 
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GHG emissions was a political question better suited for decision by the 
political branches than the courts.129  Because it reversed the district
court’s dismissal of the case on political question grounds, the Second
Circuit addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue.130  After  
suggesting that state standing in the Massachusetts decision may have 
been based on multiple grounds, the court of appeals concluded that the 
state plaintiffs had standing under both a parens patriae theory of standing 
and the three-part Article III standing test.131 
Additionally, the Second Circuit examined whether the states and land 
trusts plaintiffs had Article III standing in their proprietary capacity as 
property owners.132  The court of appeals applied the three-part Article
III standing test.133  For the standing test for injury, the Second Circuit 
determined that the state plaintiffs had properly alleged current injury by
showing increased temperatures resulting from rising levels of carbon 
dioxide had reduced the size of the California snowpack and thus reduced
the amount of fresh water in that state.134  Also, similar to the reasoning 
in the Massachusetts decision, the court of appeals concluded that the state
plaintiffs adequately alleged future injury to their coastal lands from rising 
sea levels caused by climate change, despite the defendants’ argument that 
such injuries were not imminent.135  For similar reasons, the Second Circuit
determined that the land trust plaintiffs had proven future harm to their 
properties from rising sea levels resulting from increasing levels of carbon
dioxide caused by human activities, especially burning fossil fuels.136 
Employing the approach to standing causation and redressability in the 
Massachusetts decision, the Second Circuit concluded that the defendants, 
as the five largest utility sources of GHGs in the U.S., were significant 
contributors to climate change harms; therefore, their emissions were
sufficient to establish traceable causation and injury for Article III standing
purposes, although a majority of global GHG emissions come from other
137sources.
129. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 332 (quoting Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power 
Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1550. 
130. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 315, 333; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1550. 
131. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 334–39; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1550. 
132. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 339–40; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1550. 
133. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 340–49; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1550. 
134. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 341–42; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1550. 
135. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 342–44; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1550;
see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–23 (2007). 
136. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 342–44; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1551.
 137. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 345–47; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1551;
see Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523–25. 
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Addressing standing redressability, the defendants contended that the 
plaintiffs had failed to show that their proposed remedy of reducing carbon
dioxide emissions from the defendants’ electric power plants was likely
to prevent global warming.138  The Second Circuit, however, concluded that
the Massachusetts decision had rejected arguments similar to the defendants’
claims regarding redressability.139 Based on the analysis in Massachusetts, the 
court of appeals determined that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that it was
likely that a court decision in their favor ordering reductions in carbon 
dioxide emissions from the defendants’ power plants would slow or
reduce the pace of global climate change even if it would not stop climate 
change entirely.140 
Based on the reasoning in the Massachusetts decision, the Second 
Circuit’s conclusion that the states plaintiffs had standing was plausible 
in light of the similarities in the injuries, causation and redressability in 
both cases.141  The Second Circuit did not specifically decide whether New
York City, a municipal plaintiff, had standing because only one plaintiff 
among the states plaintiffs needed to have standing for a suit to proceed.142 
More debatable was the Second Circuit’s holding that the private land trust
plaintiffs had standing because the Massachusetts decision had avoided 
addressing the standing rights of the private plaintiffs in that case and even 
implied that states have greater standing rights than non-state parties.143 
The Second Circuit arguably should have avoided the contentious question
of standing for the non-state plaintiffs because the injunctive remedies 
sought by the states and private land trust plaintiffs were the same.144 The
Second Circuit possibly treated the standing rights of the private and state 
plaintiffs as roughly similar; however, the court of appeals never clearly
 138. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 348; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1551. 
139. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 348 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525); 
Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1551. 
140. Id. at 348–49 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 525–26); Mank, WEC, supra note 
*, at 1551–52. 
141. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1552. 
142. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 339 n.17 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad.
& Int’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)).
143. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1552; see Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518. 
144. Jonathan H. Adler, The Supreme Court Disposes of a Nuisance Suit: American
Electric Power v. Connecticut, 2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 295, 304–05, 312 n.79 
(arguing that the Second Circuit in AEP should not have addressed standing of private parties);
Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1552. 
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compared the standing rights of the states and private trust parties.145 By
contrast, as Part IV will discuss, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in WEC 
contended that non-state plaintiffs do not possess the same standing rights 
in climate change suits as the state plaintiff in Massachusetts.146 
2. The Supreme Court’s Standing Decision in AEP
In almost every decision in which it has a tie vote, the Supreme Court 
states only that “The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”147 
The Supreme Court normally invokes that formulaic explanation because
an equally divided vote by the Court just affirms the decision below without 
setting precedent for lower courts outside that circuit.148 In the AEP decision, 
however, the Court deviated from this norm by providing a limited explanation
of how it divided on the standing and other jurisdictional issues, although 
the decision did not announce the identities of the justices who voted for 
or against standing.149  The Court declared: 
The petitioners contend that the federal courts lack authority to adjudicate this 
case.  Four members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have
Article III standing under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to challenge
EPA’s refusal to regulate [GHG] emissions, 549 U. S., at 520–526; and, further, 
that no other threshold obstacle bars review. Four members of the Court, adhering
to a dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, 549 U. S., at 535, or regarding that
decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of the plaintiffs have Article III
standing. We therefore affirm, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit’s
exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.150
 145. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1552; see Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 342, 
344–45, 347–49. 
146. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1552–53; see infra Section IV.
 147. Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per curiam); Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1553; see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191–92 (1972) (observing
that the Court has affirmed decisions by equally divided votes since the early 1800s and 
explicating that an affirmance by equally divided Supreme Court does not have precedential
significance). 
148. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 191–92; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1553; see Durant v.
Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110–13 (1868) (discussing principle in American and
English law that no affirmative precedent should be based on a decision where the judges 
are equally divided); Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Warming an EPA Worry, at First, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2011, 1:31 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/opinion-
analysis-warming-an-epa-worry-at-first (“Because the Court split 4–4 on the right to sue issue,
that part of the Second Circuit decision was left intact, but without setting a nationwide 
precedent.”); see also Michael B. Gerrard, ‘American Electric Power’ Leaves Open Many 
Questions for Climate Litigation, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 2011,  http://www.arnoldporter.com/ 
resources/documents/Arnold&PorterLLP_NewYorkLawJournal_Gerrard_7.14.11.pdf (stating
that the standing portion of the AEP case “did not set precedent in the technical sense”).
149. AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1553. 
150. AEP, 564 U.S. at 420 (footnote and citation omitted). 
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While not binding as a decision for the lower courts outside the Second
Circuit,151 the AEP decision’s four to four affirmance of the standing decision
possibly provides clues to how the Court might rule in future standing cases
involving climate change, at least until the Court’s membership changes
because of future retirements or presidential appointments to the Court.152 
To guess which justices voted in favor or against standing in AEP, the 
best guide is how the justices had voted in the Massachusetts decision. 153 
Three of the five justices who voted in favor of state standing in the
Massachusetts decision154 remained members of the Court when AEP was 
decided; most commentators have presumed that Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg,
and Breyer voted in favor of standing in AEP, consistent with their
approval of state standing in the Massachusetts decision.155  Four Justices
dissented in the Massachusetts decision against state standing; Chief 
Justice Roberts; and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.156  These four 
justices remained on the Court at the time of the AEP decision,157 and the
most likely assumption is that these four justices voted against standing in 
the AEP case as they had in the Massachusetts decision.158 
At the time of the AEP decision, Justices Stevens and Souter had retired
from the Court and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor respectively had 
replaced them.159  Justice Elena Kagan was the only member of the Court who
voted in AEP, but was not a member of the Court when Massachusetts
 151. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009); Mank,
WEC, supra note *, at 1554. 
152. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1554–57. 
153. Id. at 1554–55. 
154. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501, 526 (2007) (listing Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in majority opinion agreeing with standing for the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts); see Members of the Supreme Court of the United
States, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/4YGT-3LVX] (last updated Mar. 31, 2016). 
155. Gerrard, supra note 148 (“Though unnamed in the opinion, clearly the four
justices who find standing, and no other obstacles to review, are [Justices] Ginsburg, Breyer,
Kagan, and Kennedy.”); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1554. 
156. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
157. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 154. 
158. See Gerrard, supra note 148 (“The four who disagree [that there is standing in
the AEP decision] are Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.”); Mank, WEC, supra note *, 
at 1554. 
159. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 154 (providing 
the dates for when Justices served and who they replaced).
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was decided.160 Commentators have presumed that she voted in AEP with 
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer in part because it was unlikely
that any of the dissenting justices in the Massachusetts decision changed 
their views about standing in the AEP decision.161 Also, in her limited tenure
on the Court, she has usually adopted a broad view of standing for plaintiffs.162 
Moreover, she has most frequently voted with Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.163 
Justice Sotomayor recused herself from voting in the AEP decision, but one 
may speculate that, based on her usually liberal interpretation of standing 
for plaintiffs164 and her propensity to vote with the other justices appointed
by Democratic Presidents,165 that she would vote for state standing in cases
similar to Massachusetts or AEP; however, one could not be certain until
she actually votes in a GHG or state standing case.166
 160. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1554; see AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 429 (noting that 
Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the AEP decision). 
161. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1554–55 & n.187 (arguing that experience judges 
do not often change their views on important issues and that these four justices have continued
to apply a narrow approach to standing in cases such as Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681, 2685–89 (2013) 
(indicating that Justice Kagan joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, which concluded
that the requirement of adversarial parties was a flexible prudential requirement); Clapper, 
133 S. Ct. at 1159–65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice Kagan joined Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion, which argued for liberal probabilistic standing and rejected the
majority opinion’s narrow “certainly impending” test); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. 
v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 147–48 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that taxpayers had
standing to challenge Arizona’s tuition tax credit); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1555. 
163. During the Supreme Court’s 2010–2011 term, Justice Kagan voted with Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer in 91% and 87% of all cases respectively.  KEDAR BHATIA, FINAL STAT
PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2010, SCOTUSblog at 19 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 STAT PACK],
sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q42M-86RJ].  In the 2014–2015 term, Justice Kagan voted with Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer in 94% and 93% of all cases respectively.  KEDAR BHATIA, FINAL STAT
PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2014, SCOTUSblog at 28 (2015) [hereinafter 2014 STAT PACK],
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SB_agreement-highlow_
OT14.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW4X-9KTM]. 
164. See Adler, supra note 144, at 313; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1555. 
165. Robert Barnes, Justices Who Will Shape Supreme Court’s Future Are Matching
Pairs, Wash. Post (June 28, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/justices-who-
will-shape-supreme-courts-future-are-matching-pairs/2011/06/28/AGOaNopH_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/LRS5-BKRH] (observing that Justice Sotomayor has consistently voted
with liberal Justices Breyer and Ginsburg); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1555; see also
2010 STAT PACK, supra note 163, at 19 (reporting that, between liberal Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg and Justices Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor agreed the least number of times during the 2010–2011 term—at 85% of 
the time) and 2014 STAT PACK, supra note 163, at 28 (reporting that, between liberal Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justices Kagan and Sotomayor agreed the least
number of times during the 2014–2015 term—at 91% of the time). 
166. Mank, Tea Leaves, supra note *, at 593–95 (predicting that Justice Sotomayor
would vote in favor of state standing in climate change cases); Mank, WEC, supra note *,
310
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Four justices in the AEP decision determined that at least “some” of the 
plaintiffs met Article III standing requirements in light of Massachusetts.167 
The “some plaintiffs” mentioned by the AEP decision were most likely the
states plaintiffs because the Massachusetts decision only endorsed standing 
rights for states to bring suits involving climate change.168  The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in WEC inferred that the “some” plaintiffs in AEP were
likely only the state plaintiffs.169 
What is unclear is whether a majority of the Court would grant similar 
standing rights to private or non-state plaintiffs in climate change cases as 
it has for states in Massachusetts.170  It is uncertain whether the four justices 
who voted for standing in AEP would also support standing for private or 
non-state plaintiffs in a climate change case.171  During the oral argument
in Massachusetts, Justice Kennedy stated that the Tennessee Copper 
decision was the “best case” for the plaintiffs.172  If his remarks at that
oral argument reflect his views on standing, Justice Kennedy appears to
support special state standing rights under a parens patriae doctrine that
does not apply to non-state plaintiffs.173  Professor Gerrard speculates that 
when the language in the AEP opinion stating that “[f]our members of the
Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing 
under Massachusetts”174 is “considered in conjunction with Massachusetts,”
that one might infer that “Justice Kennedy believes that only states would 
have standing. Thus, there might be a 5–4 majority against any kinds of 
GHG nuisance claims (and maybe other kinds of GHG claims) by non-
states.”175  Until the Supreme Court addresses a GHG or climate change
at 1555–56 (same); Dru Stevenson & Sonny Eckhart, Standing as Channeling in the 
Administrative Age, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1382 (2012) (same). 
167.  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011). 
168. See Adler, supra note 144, at 309–10 (suggesting the four justices in AEP who 
stated that at least “some plaintiffs” had standing, were most likely referring to the states’ 
plaintiffs); Gerrard, supra note 148 (same); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1556 (same). 
169. See Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1572, 1581–84; infra Section IV. 
170. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1556–57.
 171. Id. at 1557. 
172. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14–15, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007) (No. 05–1120). 
173. Mank, States Standing, supra note *, at 1738–40 (“It seems most likely that Justice
Kennedy suggested that the majority rely on Tennessee Copper” and hence parens patriae state
standing); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1557 (same). 
174.  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011). 
175. Gerrard, supra note 148; see also Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1529, 1557, 
1567, 1585 (discussing Professor Gerrard’s view that Justice Kennedy may only support 
 311
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The Ninth Circuit’s decision in WEC is consistent with Professor
Gerrard’s view that the Supreme Court in the Massachusetts and the AEP
decisions clearly acknowledged the standing of only state plaintiffs in
GHG suits and implicitly applied a more stringent standing test on the private
plaintiffs seeking to regulate GHGs.176  Because the Massachusetts decision 
did not assert clear standards for distinguishing between the standing 
rights of states and private parties, it is difficult to decide whether the Ninth
Circuit’s narrow approach to private party standing rights in WEC is 
consistent with Massachusetts.177  Beyond the difference between having
private and state litigants respectively in the two cases, a possibly
distinguishing difference between WEC and Massachusetts is that the 
amount of GHGs involved in the former case had a far less significant 
impact on global emissions than in the latter case, and that difference
could be used to deny standing rights to either state or non-state parties.178 
A. The District Court Decision in Favor of the Plaintiffs Only 

Briefly Addresses Standing 

In WEC, the two plaintiffs, the Washington Environmental Council and
the Sierra Club, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Washington against the three directors of, in their official capacities,
respectively, the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology),
the Northwest Clean Air Agency (NWCAA), and the Puget Sound Clean
Air Agency (PSCAA) under the federal CAA.179  The Plaintiffs alleged that
the three agencies were not enforcing Washington’s State Implementation
Plan (SIP) pursuant to the CAA, which they contended requires the agencies
to establish reasonably available control technology (RACT) standards for
GHG emissions and apply those standards to every substantial oil refinery
in the state.180  Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted that the five oil refineries
standing for states in GHG suits and not for any other type of plaintiff). For Professor Gerard’s
biography, see Michael B. Gerrard, COLUMBIA LAW SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
fac/Michael_Gerrard [https://perma.cc/7BEP-AQEZ] (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
2011); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1567. 
176. See infra Section IV.
 177. See infra Section IV.
 178. See infra Section IV and Conclusion.
179. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 
180. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1211; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1567–68. 
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operating in Washington State are responsible for a significant amount of 
the state’s total GHG emissions.181  The Western States Petroleum Association 
(WSPA), of which all five of these oil refineries are members, entered an
appearance as Intervenor–Defendants.182 The plaintiffs and WSPA filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, and the three state agencies filed a 
motion to dismiss.183 
In granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the district 
court concluded that “the Agencies are obligated to establish RACT for 
GHG emissions under the RACT provision.”184 The district court only 
briefly discussed Article III standing when it denied the defendants’
motion to strike the plaintiffs’ standing declarations.185  The District Court 
observed that those declarations had been “submitted for the purpose of 
satisfying Article III and jurisprudential standing requirements.”186 
Implicitly, the District Court apparently determined that the plaintiffs’ 
declarations had met Article III standing requirements, but the Court did 
not explain its reasoning on the standing issue.187 




Because the defendants did not challenge the plaintiffs’ statement of 
injuries alleging that increased GHGs from humans burning fossil fuels 
causes a “greenhouse effect” that then causes reduced snowpack and
increased forest fires, the Ninth Circuit in WEC assumed, without deciding 
the standing injury question, that the plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendants’ 
failure to set a RACT standard for GHGs had injured some of their members 
181. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1211; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1568. 
182. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1211; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1568. 
183. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1212; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1568. 
184. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1212; see generally id. at 1213–20 (explaining 
why state agencies must establish RACT for GHG emissions based on the plain language 
of the RACT provision, but also disagreeing with the plaintiffs that the defendants violated
the “Narrative Standard” because that standard “is not actionable as a citizen suit”); Mank, 
WEC, supra note *, at 1568. 
185. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1219–20; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1568–69.
 186. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)) for the Supreme Court’s three-part standing test); Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1568–69. 
187. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1569. 
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was sufficient to establish an injury in fact for Article III standing.188 The 
court of appeals, however, held that the plaintiffs “failed to satisfy the
causality and redressability requirements to establish Article III standing.”189 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit “vacate[d] the district court’s order on the
parties’ dispositive motions and remand with instructions that the action
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”190 
Initially, the Ninth Circuit agreed with WSPA “that the chain of causality
between Defendants’ alleged misconduct and their injuries is too
attenuated.”191  The court reasoned that the plaintiffs have the burden of 
establishing that their injuries are “causally linked or ‘fairly traceable’ to 
the Agencies’ alleged misconduct” rather than the result of GHG emissions
from third parties not before the court.192  Despite assuming that GHG
emissions may cause serious harms, the Ninth Circuit explained that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove a causal connection between the defendants’
failure to set RACT standards and the alleged harms to the plaintiffs.193 
Because the plaintiffs did not explain how the absence of RACT controls 
at five refineries located in Washington State caused specific injuries to
the plaintiffs’ members, the Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs 
had “failed to satisfy their evidentiary burden of showing causality at the
summary judgment stage.”194 
In a broad assertion that could prevent future non-state plaintiffs from 
proving standing in GHG suits against regional or local projects, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded, in what is arguably dicta, that it is difficult to prove 
standing causation between local sources of GHGs and the global or
regional climate change impacts.195  The Ninth Circuit reasoned: 
188. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2013); Mank, 
WEC, supra note *, at 1569. 
189. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1135, 1141, 1147; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1569; see 
also Richard Frank, New Standing Barriers Erected for Federal Court Climate Change 
Litigation, LEGAL PLANET (Oct. 24, 2013), http://legal-planet.org/2013/10/24/new-standing-
barriers-erected-for-federal-court-climate-change-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/KA22-DMZB].
190. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1135 (footnote omitted); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1569. 
191. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1141; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1569–70. 
192. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1141; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1570. 
193. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1142; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1570. 
194. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1142–43; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1570. In a footnote, 
the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Second Circuit’s finding of standing causation in
Connecticut v. American Electric Power “because the Second Circuit case involved a different
procedural posture (a motion to dismiss, rather than summary judgment) and state entities—
both of which permit less strenuous levels of proof to achieve standing.”  WEC, 732 F.3d 
at 1143 n.6; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1570 n.291. 
195. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1143; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1570. 
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Indeed, attempting to establish a causal nexus in this case may be a particularly
challenging task. This is so because there is a natural disjunction between Plaintiffs’
localized injuries and the greenhouse effect.  Greenhouse gases, once emitted from a
specific source, quickly mix and disperse in the global atmosphere and have a 
long atmospheric lifetime.  Current research on how greenhouse gases influence 
global climate change has focused on the cumulative environmental effects from
aggregate regional or global sources.  But there is limited scientific capability in
assessing, detecting, or measuring the relationship between a certain GHG emission 
source and localized climate impacts in a given region.196 
Because the plaintiffs could not “‘quantify a causal link’” between GHG 
emissions from the five Washington State refineries and global climate 
change in that state or “‘anywhere else,’” the Ninth Circuit determined
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove standing causation.197 Future scientific 
developments, however, may allow plaintiffs to prove how a particular GHG 
source affects local or regional areas, and, therefore, undermine the Ninth
Circuit’s apparent assumption that localized impacts from GHGs are too
difficult to prove.198  As Part V will discuss, the district court’s decision in 
CBD considered the local impacts of GHGs to establish standing just two 
years after the Ninth Circuit had predicted that plaintiffs would generally
be unable to connect GHG emissions to local environmental impacts.199 
Notably, with reasoning that could affect future climate suits by non-
state plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
relaxed standing approach for state plaintiffs in the Massachusetts decision 
was relevant in their case.200  The court of appeals reasoned, “In contrast
to Massachusetts v. EPA, the present case neither implicates a procedural right
nor involves a sovereign state.  Rather, Plaintiffs are private organizations, and
therefore cannot avail themselves of the ‘special solicitude’ extended to 
196. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1143; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1570–71. 
197. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1143–44 (internal quotation marks omitted); Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1571. 
198. From Global Climate Change to Local Consequences, REALCLIMATE (Nov. 3,
2013), http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2013/11/from-global-climate-change-to-
local-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/JGG3-G7GM] (“In o[rder] to understand the local 
impacts of a climate change, I need to address the question of how I can calculate the regional 
response from a global change perspective. This is called ‘downscaling’. Regional and local
climate aspects are computed, based on different climate models, statistical analyses, empirical 
data, and assumptions. The choice of calculation method varies from case to case, and
depends on what I want to know and how I think a local climate change will affect me.”); 
Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1571. 
199. See infra Section V.
 200. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1144–45; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1572. 
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Massachusetts by the Supreme Court.” 201 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
explained, “But even if we assume that Plaintiffs’ members are entitled to
a comparable relaxed standard, the extension of Massachusetts to the 
present circumstances would not be tenable.”202  The court of appeals limited
the scope of Massachusetts by emphasizing language in that decision
describing the proposed regulation of GHG emissions from U.S. motor 
vehicles at issue in that case.  The Supreme Court stated that the emissions 
at issue in Massachusetts made a “meaningful contribution” to global 
GHG levels because American motor vehicles contributed 6% of world 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions.203  On the other hand, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the GHG emissions in its case did not make a
“meaningful contribution” to global GHG emissions because the five 
Washington State refineries at issue only emitted 5.94 million metric tons 
of carbon dioxide equivalents or 5.9% of one state’s GHG emissions, and 
the plaintiffs had failed to address to what extent those emissions affected
national or global GHG emissions.204 
In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court’s
standing reasoning in AEP.205  The WEC decision observed that the four
Justices in AEP who thought that the standing analysis in Massachusetts
applied to the facts in its case stated that “at least some” of the plaintiffs 
in AEP had standing and that “some” language might include only the eight 
state plaintiffs and not any of the private plaintiffs in AEP.206  Because
AEP only clearly implied that the state plaintiffs in its case had standing, 
the Ninth Circuit suggested that the AEP decision offered no support to the
private plaintiffs in its case.207  Also, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the GHG 
emissions involved in AEP were far greater than those at stake in the WEC
decision because the “AEP plaintiffs alleged that the electric companies
were the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States, 
collectively responsible for 650 million tons annually—equivalent to 25%
of emissions from the domestic electric power sector, 10% of emissions
from all human activities [in the United States], and 2.5% of all man-made 
emissions worldwide.”208  On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit observed
that the WEC plaintiffs “fail[ed] to provide any allegation or evidence of 
201. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1145. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1572.
 204. WEC, 732 F.3d. at 1145–46; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1572. 
205. WEC, 732 F.3d. at 1146 n.8; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1572–73. 
206. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1146 n.8 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564
U.S. 410, 420 (2011)); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1572–73 & n.309. 
207. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1146 n.8; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1572–73 & n.309. 
208. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1146 n.8 (citing AEP, 564 U.S. at 416–18); Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1573. 
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[the impact of the five Washington State refineries at issue in the case on] 
global GHG levels at the summary judgment stage.”209 
Furthermore, the WEC decision determined that the plaintiffs could not 
prove redressability “for many of the same reasons they fail to meet the 
causality requirement.”210  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that any possible
reduction of GHG emissions from imposing RACT standards on refineries in
Washington State “would likely not result in meaningful greenhouse gas 
reductions because RACT is a low bar and many sources are likely already
meeting or exceeding RACT.”211  Additionally, the court of appeals decision 
suggested that even the complete elimination of all GHG emissions from
Washington refineries would result in “scientifically indiscernible” reductions
in global GHG levels.212  Accordingly, for these various reasons, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the private plaintiffs in its case were not entitled to 
the relaxed redressability standards that the Massachusetts decision had 
applied to state plaintiffs.213 
C. 	Ninth Circuit Denies Rehearing En Banc, but Three Judges Dissent 
and Two Panel Members Defend Their Decision
The Ninth Circuit denied en banc review in WEC.214  Dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc, however, three court of appeals judges 
argued that the panel’s opinion was overly broad in interpreting the 
Massachusetts decision to deny standing rights to all non-state GHG 
plaintiffs and too restrictive by adopting an “unidentified threshold of 
emissions test” to foreclose citizen suits seeking to use the Clean Air Act 
to “fight global warming.”215  Responding to the dissenting opinion, two 
judges who were members of the original three-judge panel defended the
panel decision.216
 209. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1146 n.8 (citing AEP, 564 U.S. at 416–18); Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1573. 
210. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1146–47; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1573. 
211. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1146; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1573. 
212. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1146–47; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1573. 
213. WEC, 732 F.3d at 1147; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1573. 
214. See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 741 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en
banc); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1579–83. 
215. Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1079–81 (Gould, J., dissenting); Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1579–81. 
216. Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1076–79 (Smith, J., concurring); Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1579–83. 
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1. Judge Gould’s Dissenting Opinion from the Denial of
Rehearing En Banc 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ronald M. Gould argued that the panel
had improperly interpreted Massachusetts by suggesting that non-state 
entities can never bring GHG suits under the CAA and, accordingly, that
the Ninth Circuit erred in denying a rehearing en banc.217  He explained: 
Massachusetts v. EPA, in my view, does not mean that only states have standing 
for environmental challenges relating to global warming.  The Supreme Court’s
reasoning endorsed the principle that causation and redressability exist, independent 
of sovereign status, when some incremental damage is sought to be avoided. 
Accordingly, Massachusetts v. EPA also confers standing upon individuals seeking to
induce state action to protect the environment.218 
Based on an environmental policy analysis, Judge Gould maintained that
denying standing to non-state plaintiffs in climate change suits would impede 
litigation aiming to address the serious problem of global warming.219 
He reasoned that “just as a state has Article III standing to sue the federal
government to encourage federal action to stem global warming,” pursuant
to the Massachusetts decision, “so too may individuals or environmental
organizations sue states to encourage state action for the same purpose.”220 
2. Judge Smith Rebuts Judge Gould and Defends the 
Panel Decision 
In his opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Milan 
Smith argued that the panel decision’s standing analysis was required by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lujan,221 which applied more stringent
standing requirements to private litigants challenging government
regulation of third parties than to parties directly challenging government 
regulation that allegedly directly injures them.222  However, even if Judge
Smith correctly interpreted Lujan to apply more stringent standing 
requirements to private litigants challenging government regulation of
third parties, Christopher Warshaw and Gregory E. Wannier, in a quantitative
analysis of 1,935 lower court opinions, have shown that most lower courts 
currently do not actually apply more stringent standing requirements to
 217. Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1079 (Gould, J., dissenting); Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1580. 
218. Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1080; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1580. 
219. Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1081; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1581. 
220. Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1081; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1581. 
221.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992). 
222. Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1076–77 (Smith, J., concurring); Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1581. 
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private litigants challenging government regulation of third parties than to
parties challenging government regulation that allegedly directly injures 
them.223  They show224 that Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Lujan was weakened, 
although not overruled, by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. (Laidlaw),225 
which held that plaintiffs that avoid recreational activities in a river because 
of “reasonable concerns” about pollution released by the defendant into
the river have standing to sue under the Clean Water Act even if they 
cannot prove that the pollution has caused actual environmental harm.226 
Because the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence contains both stringent 
and liberal decisions,227 it was plausible for Judge Smith to reach a significantly 
different interpretation of standing case law than Judge Gould.228 
Judge Smith contrasted standing in the Massachusetts decision from its
denial in the WEC case based on two reasons.229  He explained that the
Massachusetts decision applied a more lenient standing analysis because
“(1) the asserted injury was an alleged procedural violation, and (2) the
action was brought by a sovereign state” and that “[n]either factor [was] 
present” in the WEC case.230 Although Judge Smith accurately describes
two standing principles in the Massachusetts decision, it is not clear that 
those two elements are required for standing in every climate change suit.
 223. See, e.g., Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1147–
51 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding plaintiffs had standing in light of Laidlaw decision because of 
recreational injuries traceable to defendant’s pollution); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 159–64 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also
Christopher Warshaw & Gregory E. Wannier, Business As Usual? Analyzing The Development
Of Environmental Standing Doctrine Since 1976, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 303, 319 
(2011) (containing an empirical analysis of 1935 lower court cases, and asserting that 
Justice Scalia’s two Lujan decisions led to more dismissal of environmentalist citizen suits,
but that subsequent Laidlaw decision reversed that trend); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 
1581 & n.369. 
224. See generally Warshaw & Wannier, supra note 223, at 289–322 (contrasting Lujan
and Laidlaw).
225.  528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
226. Id. at 181–86; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1581–82; see generally Warshaw
& Wannier, supra note 223, at 289–322 (contrasting Lujan and Laidlaw).
227. See generally Warshaw & Wannier, supra note 223, at 289–322 (contrasting 
Lujan and Laidlaw); Bradford C. Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing,
50 HOUS. L. REV. 71 (2012) (contrasting standing approaches of Justices Scalia, Breyer
and Judge Posner); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1581–82. 
228. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1581–82. 
229.  Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 721 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014). 
230. Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1581–82 (emphasis added). 
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First, in AEP, four Supreme Court justices recognized standing in a substantive
tort suit seeking an injunction and not a procedural suit.231  Second, neither
the Massachusetts decision nor the AEP decision clearly decided the issue
of non-state standing rights in GHG suits.232  The panel decision’s language
was broader than necessary in implying that non-state plaintiffs may never
bring climate change suits.233 The WEC decision did not resolve whether all 
private GHG suits are barred because the facts in that case involving five 
state refineries are distinguishable from cases involving national regulation of
large sources of GHG emissions, as in Massachusetts, or tort suits 
involving the largest GHG emitters in the United States, as in AEP.234 A 
court theoretically could grant standing to a non-state plaintiff alleging
that a group of defendants has injured them by emitting large amounts of 
GHGs or that the government, through a lack of regulation of significant 
GHG emissions, has caused a significant impact to the global environment 
that injures the plaintiffs in a concrete manner.235  Two recent district court 
decisions have shown how local impacts from GHG emissions or government
regulation might provide standing for non-state parties.236 
V. CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. EPA
In CBD, the district court held that members of the plaintiff CBD
suffered concrete standing injuries from the defendant EPA’s approval of 
Washington’s and Oregon’s decisions not to identify any waters experiencing
ocean acidification as impaired under the Clean Water Act (CWA).237 The
case involved the water quality problem of ocean acidification and its
effects on aquatic life in the coastal and estuarine waters of the states of
Washington and Oregon.238 Ocean acidification is a long-term decrease in
the pH of the earth’s oceans caused by both natural phenomena, such as
upwelling of deep ocean water and freshwater inputs from rivers, and
anthropogenic factors such as nutrient deposits from agricultural runoff, 
carbon deposits from storm water runoff and industrial pollution, and 
local emissions of nitrogen and sulfur oxides.239  However, the leading 
cause of acidification is combustion of fossil fuels resulting in carbon 
231.  See supra Sections III.D and III.E; Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1582. 
232.  See Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1582–83. 
233. Id. at 1583–85. 
234. Id.
 235. Id.
 236. See infra Sections V and VI. 
 237.  Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1187–88 (W.D. Wash. 
2015).
238.  Id. at 1181. 
239. Id. at 1182. 
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dioxide (CO2) emissions that increase atmospheric CO2.240  Seawater absorbs
some of the excess CO2 in the atmosphere, which leads to a series of
chemical reactions that make the seawater more acidic.241 Some scientists
estimate that anthropogenic sources of atmospheric carbon dioxide have
increased the acidity of average open-ocean surface waters by about 30%.242 
The increasing acidification of the oceans affects marine organisms,
and especially shellfish whose shells and skeletons are composed of
calcium carbonate.243  The same chemical reactions that increase the acidity
of the ocean reduce the concentration of carbonate ions that shellfish rely
on to build shells.244  Furthermore, the reduction of precipitated carbonate
ions decreases the saturation states of important biominerals, corrodes 
their chemical structures, and dissolves the shells of small crustaceans and 
immature shellfish.245  Because shellfish provide habitats, shelter, or food 
for other marine plants and animals, ocean acidification also threatens
other marine species and the broader marine environment.246  The CBD’s 
members alleged that their recreational opportunities to catch shellfish in
the two states’ coastlines and estuaries were diminishing as a result of
GHG emissions that cause ocean acidification, and the two states’ failure
to regulate their waters affected by acidification.247 
The Clean Water Act requires each state to set water quality standards
for all waters within its boundaries.248  In particular, Section 303(d) of the Act
mandates that every two years each state must generate a list of impaired
water bodies for which existing pollution controls are insufficient to meet 
the water quality standards applicable to the water body.249  Pursuant to
Section 303(d), states must submit their impaired waters lists to the EPA 
for approval.250 If it disapproves of a state Section 303(d) list, the EPA must
identify the waters that should have been listed as impaired within 30 








247. Id. at 1187–88, 1195. 
248. Id. at 1182–83. 
249.  Id. at 1183 (discussing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2012); 40 CFR § 130.7(d)(1) (2014)). 
250.  Id. (discussing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40 CFR § 130.7(d)(1)). 
251. Id. (discussing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40 CFR § 130.7(d)(1)). 
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establish a total maximum daily load (TMDL) of each pollutant that the
water body can receive and still meet water quality standards.252  In 2010,
the EPA issued a memorandum instructing states to list waters not meeting
water quality standards because of ocean acidification on their 2012 
Section 303(d) lists.253 
Neither Washington State nor Oregon in their submitted Section 303(d) lists 
included any coastal or estuarine waters impaired by ocean acidification.254 
During the appropriate notice and comment periods, the plaintiff submitted
comments and scientific studies to Washington, Oregon, and the EPA
arguing that Washington’s and Oregon’s water quality standards were
violated as a result of due to ocean acidification, and, therefore, that the 
EPA should disapprove the two state’s Section 303(d) lists to the extent 
the lists failed to identify waters harmed by acidification.255  In the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, CBD challenged the 
EPA’s approval of Washington’s and Oregon’s 303(d) lists as arbitrary and
capricious because the lists did not identify any coastal waters as impaired
by ocean acidification.256 
The EPA and the plaintiff filed cross motions for summary judgment 
on the merits of whether the EPA’s approval of Washington’s and Oregon’s
303(d) lists was arbitrary and capricious because the lists did not identify 
any coastal waters as impaired by ocean acidification.257  Additionally, the
Western States Petroleum Association and American Petroleum Institute
(collectively, API) in its amicus curiae brief questioned the Article III 
standing of the plaintiff, and the district court explicitly recognized that it
had “an independent duty to assure that standing exists, irrespective of
whether the parties challenge it.”258  To prove that the plaintiff had standing
through injuries suffered by its members, the CBD submitted declarations 
from several of its members addressing specific aesthetic and recreational
injuries they were suffering or will suffer due to ocean acidification,
especially from diminishing numbers of shellfish in waters in Washington 
State or Oregon they regularly visited.259 
The district court concluded that the allegations in these declarations 
qualified as the type of aesthetic and recreational injuries recognized by the
 252.  Id. (discussing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40 CFR § 130.7(d)(1)). 
253. Id.
 254. Id. at 1184. 
255. Id. at 1185. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 1181–82. 
258. Id. (quoting Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013)).
259.  Id. at 1187. 
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Supreme Court in Laidlaw.260  Furthermore, the court determined that these
alleged harms spanned a sample set of beaches and coastline that is 
geographically representative of Washington’s and Oregon’s coastlines and
estuaries, and, therefore satisfied the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that a
plaintiff seeking state-wide environmental relief establish that a representative 
number of areas were adversely affected by the government’s action.261 
Also, the API did not challenge the CBD’s assertions of standing injury, but
only whether they had demonstrated standing causation and redressability.262 
The court held that the plaintiff had alleged specific facts demonstrating a 
concrete and imminent standing injury in fact.263 
Next, the district court addressed in depth the contested question of 
whether CBD had proven the overlapping requirements of causation and 
redressability.264  The API argued that the WEC decision “preclude[d]
CBD from establishing that the EPA’s approval of the 303(d) lists caused
its members’ injuries and that a favorable ruling would redress those injuries”
because the Ninth Circuit’s decision had found that “climate change was
the cumulative result of greenhouse gas emissions from numerous independent 
sources intermingling on a global scale,” and, therefore, plaintiffs in general 
cannot demonstrate “that their localized injuries were either fairly traceable
to or redressable by EPA’s failure to require greenhouse gas emission limits” 
on local GHG sources identified in a plaintiff’s complaint.265  In particular, 
“API reasons that, because CBD cannot point to a mechanism under the 
Clean Water Act that addresses global carbon emissions in an appreciable 
way, and because the record lacks evidence regarding the effect of local 
carbon emissions on local ocean acidification, [the WEC decision] precludes
CBD from showing causation and redressability.”266  In response to these 
arguments, the plaintiff “contends that regional human-caused drivers
exacerbate ocean acidification along Washington’s and Oregon’s coasts,
and that local pollution controls can reduce the input from these drivers.”267 
Accordingly, “CBD maintains that, if its suit to add acidified-impaired
waters to the states’ 303(d) lists is successful, these local measures could be 
260. Id. at 1188 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000)). 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 1193. 
263. Id. at 1188. 
264. Id. at 1189–96. 

















   
   
  
 
















employed to implement the applicable TMDLs, thereby alleviating 
its members’ injuries.”268 
The district court agreed with the plaintiff that “causation and 
redressability are two sides of the same coin: CBD’s members’ injuries 
are traceable to EPA’s conduct and redressable by a favorable ruling to 
the extent that coastal waters improperly not identified as acidified-
impaired are influenced by sources that can be mitigated by local actions.”269 
In distinguishing the WEC decision, the district court concluded that the 
plaintiffs met the overlapping causation and redressability requirements 
for standing because the EPA’s actions adversely affected regional drivers
of acidification in the two states, not just global factors that are difficult
to measure, and local mitigation efforts could partially redress the injuries 
to their members.270  The district court rejected API’s argument that the CBD’s 
evidence was insufficient because “the relative contributions of global and 
regional anthropogenic sources to local ocean acidification remain unclear, and
therefore it is uncertain that reductions by local mitigation techniques will
be sufficient to ameliorate harm to shellfish and other marine animals;”
the court instead concluded that “CBD, however, need not establish causation 
and redressability with ‘scientific certainty.’”271  Relying on the Massachusetts 
decision, the district court concluded that a plaintiff can meet the causation 
and redressability standing requirements by showing that a defendant’s
actions exacerbate the causation effects of climate change and that a proposed 
remedy will incrementally improve those impacts.272  The court determined
that CBD had presented sufficient evidence that “local drivers of ocean 
acidification can have disproportionate and biologically significant effects 
on local Pacific Northwest waters,” and that the plaintiff had identified 
several mitigation measures that could reduce those local drivers in
specific coastal and estuarine waters in Oregon and Washington State.273 
The district court concluded: 
By connecting local anthropogenic causes to the regions visited by its members 
and identifying potential local mitigation techniques, CBD has set forth “specific 
facts” establishing a plausible connection between CBD’s members’ injuries and
EPA’s decision to approve the states’ 303(d) lists without including acidification-
impaired waters . . . . The connection is neither abstract nor hypothetical . . . . 
Those same “specific facts” show that the connection between CBD’s members’
injuries and the requested relief—a designation of impaired coastal waters or a
 268. Id.
 269. Id.
 270. Id. at 1190. 
271. Id. at 1190. 
272. Id.
 273. Id. at 1194–95. 
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remand for EPA to reconsider the 303(d) lists—is likely rather than merely
“speculative.”274 
By focusing on local and regional impacts of acidification, the district 
court was able to recognize standing for a private GHG suit despite the WEC
decision’s foreclosure of private suits involving only global injuries.275 
On the merits, the district court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove
that the EPA’s approval of Washington’s and Oregon’s 303(d) lists was 
arbitrary and capricious because the lists did not identify any coastal
waters as impaired by ocean acidification.276  Following relevant Supreme 
Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the court emphasized that an agency’s
interpretation of scientific data is entitled to considerable deference under
the arbitrary and capricious judicial review standard in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) if an agency provides a 
reasonable explanation for its decision, even if a reviewing court would
prefer a different decision.277  The “arbitrary and capricious” standard in 
Section 706(2)(A)278 is a default standard of judicial review under the
APA that applies to most agency decisions that can be classified as
informal adjudications or rulemakings.279 The district court explained that
courts are supposed to defer to an agency if a challenged decision is
plausibly reasonable: 
274. Id. at 1195. 
275. See id. at 1189–96. 
276. Id. at 1216–17. 
277. Id. at 1197 (discussing “arbitrary and capricious” judicial review standard in the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(stating a court must set aside agency’s action if it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”); see generally F.C.C. v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009) (discussing “narrow” and deferential arbitrary
and capricious judicial review standard in the Administrative Procedure Act); Motor 
Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1983); Emily Hammond
Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of 
Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 739–42 (2011) (arguing that the “reasonableness” 
of an agency decision is the key to whether the agency’s decision will survive arbitrary 
and capricious judicial review).
278. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (stating a court must set aside an agency’s action if it was 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”).
279. Meazell, supra note 277, at 739–40 (“[S]ubsection [706(2)](A) serves as a 
catch-all standard that generally applies . . . to review of informal adjudication and rulemaking.”). 
By contrast, subsection 706(2)(E) applies a substantial evidence judicial review standard
“only to ‘formal’ rulemaking and adjudication—that is, proceedings that produce a closed, 
trial-like record.” Id.
 325




     
    











   
 







   
   
  
 










The arbitrary and capricious standard is “highly deferential, presume[s] the 
agency action to be valid and requires affirming the agency action if a reasonable
basis exists for its decision.” The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the agency; rather, the agency’s decision must be affirmed if the agency
has articulated a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.” The court’s deference to the agency’s judgment “is highest when reviewing
an agency’s technical analyses and judgments involving the evaluation of complex 
scientific data within the agency’s technical expertise.”280 
The Supreme Court has agreed that an agency’s determination of 
complicated and uncertain scientific questions is entitled to greater deference 
by reviewing courts as long as the agency provides a plausible and reasonable
explanation of its interpretation of contested scientific issues.281 After 
deferentially reviewing the appropriate scientific data in the administrative
record about whether there was evidence that ocean acidification was 
currently causing harm to shellfish in the relevant Oregon and Washington 
waters,282 the district court held: “Because EPA’s approval of Washington’s
and Oregon’s Section 303(d) lists is plausible in light of the evidence and
EPA reasonably concluded that Washington and Oregon assembled and 
evaluated all existing and readily available water quality data, EPA is entitled 
to summary judgment in its favor.”283  Notably, the district court ruled
against the plaintiffs on the merits despite finding sufficient injury to 
sustain Article III standing;284 a court’s preliminary finding that a plaintiff
meets the test for standing jurisdiction by no means guarantees that the
court will find in favor of the plaintiff on the merits.285 
280. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1197 (W.D. Wash. 
2015) (citations omitted). 
281. Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)
(observing that when a court reviews an agency’s scientific determinations “within its area
of special expertise, at the frontiers of science False a reviewing court must generally be
at its most deferential.”). But see Meazell, supra note 277, at 736–38, 752, 756–64, 784 
(2011) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s special deference to an agency’s scientific 
expertise in Baltimore Gas and arguing agencies sometimes “cloak their policy choices in
the seemingly unassailable mantle of science” to gain more deferential judicial review).
282. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 1194, 1197. 
283. Id. at 1217. 
284. Compare id. at 1196 (finding standing for plaintiffs) with id. at 1217 (holding
that EPA is entitled to summary judgment). 
285. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–54 (1970) 
(recognizing that Article III standing is a preliminary issue that courts should separate 
from whether a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits); Mank, Private Parties, supra
note *, at 919–22; see infra note 289 and accompanying text. 
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A common thread linking the Massachusetts, WEC and CBD decisions
were plaintiffs seeking more stringent governmental regulation of GHG
emissions.286  By contrast, in Murray, the plaintiffs sued the EPA for the
agency’s alleged failure to consider the employment impacts of its CAA
regulations in the coal industry as an indirect challenge to the agency’s
alleged overregulation of the industry under the statute.287  The district court
in Murray concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts that the
EPA had a duty to consider the employment impacts of its CAA regulations
to establish standing, and therefore denied the agency’s motion to dismiss
on standing grounds.288 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court stated that parties that are
directly regulated by the government are entitled to a more lenient standing
analysis in challenging that regulation than plaintiffs such public interest
groups challenging the government’s alleged under-regulation or non-
regulation of third parties.289  Thus, under Lujan, when the government
directly regulates GHG emissions of industry, the regulated industry
should have standing to challenge those regulations.290  However, standing 
for industries affected by GHG regulations can become more complicated if
 286. See supra Sections III, IV and V. 
287.  Murray Energy Corp. v. McCarthy, 2015 WL 1438036 *1, *3–5 (N.D. W. Va. 
Mar. 27, 2015) (observing that plaintiffs and defendants disagreed as to whether EPA’s 
consideration of the employment impacts of its regulations would actually affect employment
in the coal industry). 
288. Id. at *9.  The EPA had previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint,
asserting that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at *1. 
On September 16, 2014, the court “denied the Motion and found, as a matter of law, that 
the EPA had a non-discretionary duty to undertake an ongoing evaluation of job losses
and that this Court had and has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.” Id. On 
December 23, 2014, the EPA filed its Motion to Dismiss Due to Lack of Article III
Standing, which the court denied on March 27, 2015. Id. at *2, *9. 
289.  504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (stating defendants who are directly regulated by
government usually have standing to sue, but that third-parties challenging the
government’s alleged failure to regulate have a greater burden to prove standing); Mank, 
WEC, supra note *, at 1581 (discussing Lujan’s distinction between presumption standing 
for regulated parties and its more stringent standing case for plaintiffs seeking the regulation of
third parties by the government). But see Haake & Ludwiszewski, supra note 2, at 312, 
317–18, 322 (arguing that standing for regulated parties was presumed for many years 
until recent D.C. Circuit cases undermined that presumption, and that Lujan placed a
heavier burden on advocacy groups seeking regulation of third parties). 
290. See Haake & Ludwiszewski, supra note 2, at 312, 317–18, 322.
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a regulation only indirectly affects an industry.291  For example, hypothetically,
what if the EPA issued regulations encouraging the use of natural gas, 
renewable energy or nuclear power that indirectly affected the coal industry,
or regulations that required cleaner air or less pollution from power plants 
that disproportionately affected coal burning plants?292  In  Murray, the
plaintiffs and defendant disagreed regarding whether the EPA’s alleged
failure to consider the employment impacts of its CAA regulations would
actually affect employment in the coal industry, and, thus, whether the 
agency’s purported failure to evaluate employment impacts was too indirect 
a cause to justify standing for the coal industry plaintiffs.293 
While regulated industry in theory enjoys clear standing rights pursuant to
Lujan, the Court arguably weakened Lujan’s distinction between lenient 
standing for regulated parties and more stringent standing for parties seeking 
government regulation of third parties in Laidlaw.294 Laidlaw recognized 
standing for environmental plaintiffs who avoid recreational or aesthetic
activities because of “reasonable concerns” about pollution even if they 
cannot prove actual harm to themselves or the environment.295  Warshaw
and Wannier’s article demonstrated that, because of Laidlaw, most lower
courts currently do not actually apply more stringent standing requirements
to private litigants challenging government regulation of third parties than 
to litigants directly challenging government regulation that allegedly
directly injures them.296  Other commentators have agreed that Laidlaw applied 
a more lenient approach to standing for environmental plaintiffs than
Lujan.297 
Indeed, some industry lawyers have contended that federal courts 
sometimes apply stricter standing requirements to regulated industry
plaintiffs than to environmental plaintiffs.298  Charles H. Haake and & 
Raymond B. Ludwiszewski argue that several recent D.C. Circuit Court 
291. Id. at 308–09, 322, 340–46. 
292. See generally id. (arguing courts do not always recognizing standing for industry
plaintiffs who challenge regulations that have indirect economic impacts on their businesses).
293. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
294. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs, (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
181–86 (2000).
295. Id.; Warshaw & Wannier, supra note 223, at 297, 300, 303 (providing an empirical
analysis of 1935 lower court cases which found that Justice Scalia’s two Lujan decisions 
led to more dismissal of environmentalist citizen suits, but that subsequent Laidlaw 
decision reversed that trend); Mank, WEC, supra note *, at 1523, 1581–82 (contrasting
Lujan and Laidlaw).
296. See generally Warshaw & Wannier, supra note 223, at 289–322; Mank, WEC, 
supra note *, at 1581–82 (discussing Warshaw & Wannier).
297. Haake & Ludwiszewski, supra note 2, at 315–17; Robert V. Percival & Joanna 
B. Goger, Escaping the Common Law’s Shadow: Standing in the Light of Laidlaw, 12
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y FORUM 119, 141–54 (2001). 
298. Haake & Ludwiszewski, supra note 2, at 308–09, 322, 340–46. 
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of Appeals decisions have tended to apply a lenient approach to standing
injury when environmental plaintiffs assert aesthetic or health injuries, but 
have applied a strict approach to standing for industry plaintiffs requiring 
them to document direct, concrete economic injuries.299  They argue that 
if federal courts are willing to entertain environmental plaintiff suits based
on vague aesthetic harms, those same courts should also consider more 
indirect economic harms to industry plaintiffs such as increased costs of 
litigation or changed marketing practices based on increased costs of new 
regulations.300  If Haake and Ludwiszewski are correct to any extent about 
a recent bias against the standing of industry plaintiffs, the decision in Murray 
is arguably a corrective decision that provides a lenient standing test for 
economic injuries suffered by energy firms regulated under the Clean Air 
Act.301 
In Murray, a West Virginia district court concluded that several coal
mining firms had standing despite the arguably indirect employment impacts
of the CAA regulations and that they affected a large number of individuals.302 
The court observed, “[t]he fact that the failure to perform employment
evaluations may affect a large number of persons or entities is not fatal to 
the plaintiffs’ standing” as long as they have “a personal stake in the outcome 
of the controversy.”303  The Murray decision cited cases that recognized 
standing injury where an agency action indirectly caused economic losses,304 
and concluded that the EPA’s alleged failure to consider the employment
impacts of its CAA regulations on the coal industry was sufficient for
standing causation in its case despite the complexities of assessing which
regulations may have affected such employment.305  The court explained: 
299. Id. at 308–09, 322, 340–46. 
300. Id. at 305, 340–41 
301.  Murray Energy Corp. v. McCarthy, 2015 WL 1438036 *1, *1–9 (N.D. W. Va. 
Mar. 27, 2015) (discussing EPA’s duty to consider employment impacts of its Clean Air 
Act regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 7621 (2012)).
302. Id. at *4–9. 
303. Id. at *4 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
304. Id. at *4.  The court cited to both White Oak Realty, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 2014 WL 4387317 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2014), and Environmental Defense Fund v.
Marsh, 651 F .2d 983, 1003 (5th Cir. 1981) for the proposition that “economic injury from
business competition created as an indirect consequence of agency action can serve as the
required ‘injury in fact,’ . . . .” Id. at *4.
 305. Murray Energy Corp., 2015 WL 1438036 at *6. 
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In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that the actions of the EPA have had a 
coercive effect on the power generating industry, essentially forcing them to
discontinue the use of coal.  This Court finds these allegations sufficient to show
that the injuries claimed by the plaintiffs are fairly traceable to the actions of the 
EPA.  While the EPA argues that such would only be traceable to the earlier actions
of the EPA rather than the failure of the EPA to conduct employment evaluations, 
this Court cannot agree.  The claimed injuries, while in part traceable to the prior
actions of the EPA, may also be fairly traceable to the failure of the EPA to
conduct the evaluations.  Congress’ purpose in enacting the requirement for the 
evaluations was to provide information which could lead the EPA or Congress to
amend the prior EPA actions.306 
The Murray decision concluded that an injunction ordering the EPA to
perform the requested employment studies would redress the plaintiffs’
alleged injuries—even if the alleged failure to conduct such evaluations
was not the sole cause of economic losses in the industry.307 
Furthermore, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to
a more relaxed standing analysis under the Lujan and the Massachusetts 
decisions because they asserted a procedural injury based upon “the fact
that the EPA has failed to conduct the employment evaluations.”308  The
Murray decision explained:
 In Massachusetts v. EPA, . . . the Supreme Court stated that “a litigant to whom
Congress has accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests,—here, 
the right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld—can assert that right 
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.
When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there
is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party 
to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.309 
The district court rejected the EPA’s argument that procedural standing 
was limited to violated procedures that are “a prerequisite to a final agency 
action.”310  Instead, the Murray decision concluded: “The denial of the
benefit of the evaluations required by [42] U.S.C. § 7621 is sufficient to 
support procedural standing.”311  Finally, the district court determined that
the plaintiffs had “informational standing” based upon the government’s
failure to provide the plaintiffs with employment evaluations that the 
agency was required to provide under the statute, relying upon Supreme 
306. Id.
 307. Id.
 308. Id. at *6–8. 
309. Id. at *6. 
310. Id. at *8. 
311. Id.
330
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Court decisions holding that the deprivation of information that a statute 
requires the government to provide is sufficient for Article III standing.312 
As it recognized, the district court’s conclusion that the coal firms have 
standing based on the EPA’s alleged failure to consider employment impacts 
of its regulations on the coal industry does not necessarily mean that the
court will uphold the plaintiffs’ arguments on the merits,313 although the court 
did conclude that “[t]he statute requires the EPA to gather certain information 
and conduct evaluations, which it has refused to do.”314  The EPA contends
that its existing agency regulatory impact analyses and other studies for
its utility air toxics rule already satisfy any possible requirement under 
the Clean Air Act to review the jobs impacts of its rules.315  However, the 
plaintiffs argue that existing EPA economic studies are insufficient under 
Section 321(a) of the statute.316 Regardless of whether the EPA or the coal 
firms win on the merits, standing is a preliminary decision that simply requires
some concrete injury to the plaintiff from a challenged action, some traceable 
causation between the challenged action and that injury, and the likelihood 
that a favorable decision by an Article III court would remedy that injury; a
plaintiff need not demonstrate that it is likely to win on the merits to have 
Article III standing.317 
VII. CONCLUSION
In his dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, Chief Justice Roberts 
indirectly raised the question of whether recognizing standing for non-
state parties in climate change suits would open the floodgates to too many
 312. Id. at *8–9; see generally Bradford C. Mank, Informational Standing After
Summers, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 15–20, 27–33 (2011) (discussing cases involving 
informational standing).
313. Id. at *5 (quoting Competitive Enter. Inst. v. NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 113 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990)) (“We note at the outset that the standing determination must not be confused 
with our assessment of whether the party could succeed on the merits.”).
314. Id. at *9. 
315. Coal Firms Reject EPA Claim Of Studies Satisfying Air Law ‘Jobs’ Review, 
INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP. (Inside Wash. Publishers, Arlington, Va.) May 5, 2015, at 2 
(discussing this dispute in Murray at summary judgment).
316. Id. 
317. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 158 (1970) 
(recognizing that Article III standing is a preliminary issue that courts should separate 
from whether a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits); Murray Energy Corp. v. 
McCarthy, 2015 WL 1438036 at *5; Mank, Private Parties, supra note *, at 919–22; Note, 
supra note 27, at 2256, 2258, 2270–77; see also Gene R. Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 
CAL. L. REV. 68, 74 (1984) (arguing Data Processing separated standing from merits). 
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suits.318  He observed, “[t]he good news is that the Court’s ‘special solicitude’ 
for Massachusetts limits the future applicability of the diluted standing 
requirements applied in this case.”319  Even Ninth Circuit Judge Gould,
who strongly supports climate change suits, acknowledged that federal 
courts might have to impose prudential limits on suits involving global
pollution problems if such suits became too numerous.320  Because the
Supreme Court has recently limited the ability of federal courts to deny 
standing for prudential reasons unrelated to Article III standing,321 courts
must limit climate suits either through stringent standing criteria, or by
limiting suits on the merits, which this Article favors.322  Courts should
recognize that the traceable causation standard for standing requires less 
proof than the proximate causation standard normally used in deciding a 
tort case or an environmental case on the merits, and, accordingly, recognize
standing even in cases a judge believes will likely fail on the merits.323 
Courts should allow standing for some non-state parties in climate
change suits, but courts should be more skeptical about allowing such
plaintiffs to win on the merits because Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting 
opinion in Massachusetts was correct.  That the political branches are
usually better suited to addressing the complex economic and social issues 
in reducing GHG emissions, such as limiting fossil fuel consumption and 
transitioning to renewable energy.324  Commentators have divided regarding
whether courts are capable of resolving climate change tort or public
318. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 547–48 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); 
infra Sections III.B and Conclusion. 
319. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 547–48. 
320. Covington v. Jefferson Cty., 358 F.3d 626, 654–55, 655 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Gould, J., concurring) (acknowledging federal courts might need to set prudential limits
on global pollution suits if such suits would overwhelm capacity of the courts); Bradford 
C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1,
4–45 (2005). For Judge Gould’s general support for climate change suits see Wash. Envtl. 
Council v. Bellon, 741 F.3d 1075, 1079–81 (9th Cir. 2014) (Gould, J., dissenting); supra
Section IV.C.1.
321.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–
88, 1387 n.3 (2014); Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doctrine Abolished or 
Waiting for a Comeback?: Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 213, 215–17 (discussing partial demise of prudential standing in Lexmark).
322. Note, supra note 27, at 2276–77 (acknowledging climate change suits could
flood courts, but arguing courts should be lenient in deciding standing and more strict on 
merits).
323. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168–69 (1997) (stating traceable standing
causation is different from proximate causation); Mank, Private Parties, supra note *, at 
919–27. But see Meier, supra note 27, at 1245–46, 1297–99 (arguing courts should change 
the standing causation standard to a proximate cause standard, so that standing law would 
“serve a gatekeeping function”).
324. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535, 548–49 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); infra Sections III.B and Conclusion. 
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nuisance suits.325  Even some proponents of climate suits have acknowledged
that such suits are designed more to “prod” the political branches to take
action than have judges resolve the merits.326  As in the Massachusetts
decision, courts are better suited to addressing whether the Executive Branch
has a statutory duty to address climate change issues pursuant to a particular
statute than as judges attempting to resolving policy questions themselves.327 
The CBD decision demonstrated—and the Murray decision explicitly
acknowledged—that a court’s initial determination that a plaintiff has
established Article III standing jurisdiction does not preclude a court from 
ruling against the plaintiff on the merits.328  Notably, in CBD, the district
court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated enough evidence of 
localized impacts on shellfish from GHG emissions to establish standing, 
but, on the merits, the court deferred to the EPA’s conclusion that there was 
not enough evidence of such impacts to force Oregon and Washington 
State to list such waters as impaired under Section 303 of the CWA.329 In 
borderline GHG cases, courts should allow standing so plaintiffs can attempt
to prove their case, but courts should not hesitate to rule against a plaintiff 
on the merits if it cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
defendant caused it harm.330
 325. Compare Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice 
Movement: The Right Thing and the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197 (2010) (favoring 
climate change tort suits), and Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About 
Tort Law, 41 ENVTL.L. 1 (2011), with Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Prods and Pleas: A Defense
of the Conventional Views on Tort and Administrative Law in the Context of Global 
Warming, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 317 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/beware-of-
prods-and-pleas-a-defense-of-the-conventional-views-on-tort-and- administrative-law-in-
the-context-of-global-warming [https://perma.cc/8Z4E-6JYZ] (criticizing climate change
tort suits), and Donald G. Gifford, The Constitutional Bounding of Adjudication: A Fuller(ian)
Explanation for the Supreme Court’s Mass Tort Jurisprudence, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1109, 
1112 (2012). 
326. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government
in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 355 (2011). 
327. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (“Because greenhouse gases fit well within the
Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant,’ we hold that EPA has the statutory
authority to regulate the emission of such gases from new motor vehicles.”). 
328. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. vs. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–53 (1970) 
(recognizing that Article III standing is a preliminary issue that courts should separate 
from whether a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits); Mank, Private Parties, supra
note *, at 919–22; see supra Sections V and VI; see Note, supra note 27, at 2276–77. 
329. See supra Section V. 
330. Note, supra note 27, at 2276–77. 
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Some commentators have questioned whether federal courts subtly
manipulate their standing analysis to avoid troublesome cases or, on the 
other hand, to address the merits when standing is not justified.331  Despite 
inevitable time pressures on federal judges, a court should not artificially
deny standing simply to avoid difficult merit questions.332  Following the
CBD decision as a model, federal courts could grant standing in a climate 
change case if a non-state party demonstrates some specific localized
impacts from GHG emissions, but courts should give significant deference to
a agency’s reasonable policy decision not to regulate GHG emissions, or 
decline to allow the type of complex public nuisance action raised in AEP 
because climate change suits on the merits raise too many policy choices
better resolved by the political branches.333 Chief Justice Roberts’ argument
that the political branches are better suited to deciding global climate 
change cases than the courts could be used at the merits stage rather than 
in deciding standing.334  If courts are skeptical in deciding in favor of climate
plaintiffs on the merits, they will not have to overly restrict standing because 
prospective plaintiffs will, on average, avoid suits that they cannot ultimately 
win on the merits.335 
331. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 
1106–07 (2015) (suggesting judges may alter standing decisions based on their views of 
the merits); David LaRoss, Despite Judge’s Call, Courts Unlikely To Clarify Key Industry 
‘Standing’ Test, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP. (Inside Wash. Publishers, Arlington, Va.), May
30, 2014, at 2 (noting that the D.C. Circuit sees “a lot of administrative [law] cases, and
they don’t want to deal with the merits of them all the time. . . .  In a difficult case where 
they don’t want to reach the merits, they can just say ‘let’s deal with this on standing.”). 
Because of its discretionary certiorari authority to deny review of cases, the Supreme Court
may not face the same pressure as lower federal courts to manipulate standing doctrine to
avoid deciding cases.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Make Sense of Supreme Court 
Standing Cases—A Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105, 
125 (2014).
332. Mank, Private Parties, supra note *, at 920. 
333. See supra Sections III.C and V. 
334. See supra Section III.C.
 335. Note, supra note 27, at 2276–77 (arguing courts should allow standing in
borderline GHG cases to give plaintiffs chance to prove their case, but on the merits should
rule against plaintiffs who cannot prove they suffered harm from a defendant). 
334
